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BOOK REVIEW

UNMASKING FEDERALISM
Carl Tobiast

NARRO\NlNG THE NATION'S PO\NER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH
THE STATES. By john 1~ Noonan, Jr. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2002. Pp. 203. $34.95.

If you were a woman attending a state college and you were raped by several
members of the football team, you would be more than outraged to discover
that, when state authorities did nothing to punish the rapists, federal law
was helpless to make up for their deficiency. Yet [this] and similar results
have been reached in the last jive years because ofjudgments of the Supreme
Court of the United States. 1

Judge John Noonan has astutely chronicled law and society over a
half century. He was a professor for twenty-five years, authoring such
classics as Persons and Masks of the Law, 2 and has rendered distinguished service since 1985 on the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. 3 Thus, the publication of Narrowing the Nation's
Power: The Supreme Court Sides with the States ("Narrowing') 4 would be
important, even if the monograph were only a venerated scholar's reflections on his long, rich experience. This book, however, is a provocative critique that meticulously and incisively exposes the Court's
new federalism and separation of powers jurisprudence as radical departures from settled understandings, departures that lack constitutional support. Noonan has issued a powerful, timely indictment of
Supreme Court decisionmaking, which is striking because his position
in the judicial hierarchy requires a keen understanding of those cases
and because some observers may have thought him sympathetic to the
Justices' dramatic new path. These ideas mean that Narrowing war-

t Beckley Singleton Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada,
Las Vegas; Visiting Williams Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to
thank Chris Bryant, Lynne Henderson, Margaret Sanner, and Rod Smith for valuable
ideas; Genny Schloss for processing this piece; and Beckley Singleton and Jim Rogers for
generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
I Joi-INT. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S PowER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES
WITH THE STATES 1-2 (2002) [hereinafter NARROWING].
2 Jo1m T. NooNAN,.JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAw (1976).
3
780 F.2d XXlll n. l 0 (l 986).
4
NARROWING, supra note l.
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rants analysis. This Review first descriptively examines the volume and
finds that Noonan illuminates comprehension of this recent, novel
turn in Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Review then explores the
work's numerous beneficial features. It concludes with several recommendations for future work in this area.
I.
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

Noonan initially traces a conundrum experienced by the American Republic since the Founding: the proper allocation of authority
between the states and the national government as well as among the
federal legislative, executive, and judicial branches.I'; The Prologue
considers how the Supreme Court has enunciated doctrines that protect the sovereignty of the fifty states. 6 The Justices have scrutinized
Congress's legislative power, especially under the Fourteenth Amendment, and have demanded "congruence and proportionality between"
the evil at issue and any legislative treatment. 7 They have also mandated that lawmakers develop a record that historically demonstrates
"widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights." 8
Those requirements shift power from Congress toward both the states
and the federal judiciary.9
The opinions Noonan assesses received facilitation when the
Court decided it had authority for the Constitution's definitive interpretation.10 The Justices invoke no express constitutional language
and ridicule "ahistorical literalism," 11 which Noonan describes as "a
5
See id. at 1-5. For several histories of the protracted, tortured debate over the states
as sovereigns, see JoHN E. NOWAK & RoNALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 3, 4
(6th ed. 2000); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 5, 6 (3d ed.
2000).
6
See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 1-5.
7
Id. at 5 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
8
Id. (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526). See generally A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy
J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress. The Supreme Court's New "On 17ie Record" Constitutional
Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 369-73 (2001) (describing the Court's
shift towards lack of deference to Congress); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro,
Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87, 107-09, 111-19 (2001) (comparing the
Court's pre-1995 deference to Congress with its less deferential stance following Boerne).
9
See NARROWING, su.pra note 1, at 5. See generally David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things
Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 Sur. CT.
REv. 31, 77 (arguing that "Congress should be permitted to go further than the Court in its
interpretation of' the Constitution).
lO
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137 (1803); NARROWING, sufJra note 1, at
7-8. See generally ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY xii-xvii
(1941) (describing the Court's assertion ofjudicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword, The SufJreme Court: 2000 Term, We the Court, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (2001) (describing and criticizing the expansion of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation).
11 NARROWINC, suf1ra note 1, at 9 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999)).
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more adventurous reading of the [C]onstitution." 12 Noonan findsjudicial "activism" an illusory analytical tool 13 and prefers logic, excoriating the "contradiction in terms" wrought by the sovereign immunity
rule as "intolerable in any rational discourse." 14 He thus posits the
modest goal of articulating a principle unbroken by multiple exceptions yet believes even worse a principle with no rationale for its creation or extension, is an apt description of the recent jurisprudence. 15
As a guiding principle, Noonan employs the purposes the people
voiced in the Constitution's Preamble: "to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility [ ] and secure the Blessings of Liberty." 16 Noonan asks whether the case results honor these
grand objectives by posing several rhetorical questions. For example,
"[d]o decisions that return the country to a pre-Civil War understanding of the nation establish a more perfect union?" 17 The answers
show that the opinions are grounded in doctrinal constructs-"state
sovereign immunity, congruence and proportionality of legislation,
and a record of evils to be eradicated" 18-without basis in the Constitution. Thus, removal of these obfuscatory doctrinal constructs clarifies the rulings' failure to serve the Constitution's purposes. 19
Noonan criticizes the constitutional balance struck as suggesting that
the fifty states count more than the millions of individuals potentially
affected by the opinions. 20 The effort to enlarge states' power simultaneously increases judicial authority vis-a-vis Congress and the President because the Court exercises discretion to ascertain whether
immunity exists, whether an enactment is congruent or proportionate, and whether a legislative record suffices. 21
The writer analogizes the present situation to other historical moments when similar decisions-decisions which replaced legislatures'
judgments with those of courts and which were subsequently discredited because they lacked constitutional support-negatively affected
12
Id.; see infra notes 40-47, 49-60 and accompanying text (supplying additional vociferous criticism of the Court by Noonan).
13
NARROWING, supra note 1, at 10.
14
15

Id.
See id.

16 U.S. CONST. pmbl.; NARROWING, supra note 1, at 11. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE (1998) (exploring American constitutional understanding and its federalism implications).
17
NARROWING, supra note 1, at 12; see infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
18
NARROWING, supra note 1, at 12.

See id.
See id. at 12-13.
21
See id. at 13; see also Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001) (arguing against the Court's "congruence and
proportionality" test); supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (reiterating the Court's
19

20

lack of deference to Congress and assertion of supremacy in interpreting the
Constitution).
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the country. 22 For example, Dred Scott v. Sandford 2 ?. led to the Civil
War, and Lochner v. New York 24 adversely affected working conditions
over several decades. 25
Noonan finds that City of Boerne v. Flores 26 is a sharp break, and
Chapter One tells its story in light of America's devotion to religious
liberty and the power that the Fourteenth Amendment granted Congress.27 The greatest danger in Boerne is how the Justices anoint themselves the paramount expositors of the Constitution by creating, for
use against future Congresses, two novel weapons: close judicial inspection of the legislative record for persuasive evidence of the evil at
issue and inspection for a congruent or proportionate response. 28
The second and third chapters use a dialogic technique, albeit
with mixed effects, to show how the Court, as the devotee of state
dignity and "history's hitchhiker," embraces sovereign immunity in
ways that are overdrawn, lack historical support, and defy consistent
application.w Chapters Four and Five assess major cases that illustrate
the "unhappy" results when the Justices apply novel legislative criteria
to sovereign immunity in the context of an old intellectual property
statute~m and a newer measure that accorded elderly and disabled individuals equality.?. 1 The sixth chapter examines the hostile judicial
reaction to legislative efforts that provided women with equal protection, a reaction premised on state autonomy and individual liberty. 82
22 S1:e NARROWING, supra note 1, at 13. See generally 1 TRIBE, supra note 5, at§§ 7-5 to -6,
at 1318-22, § 8-1, at 1332-34, §§ 8-2 to -9, at 1343-74 (describing the post-Lochner evolution of substantive due process and the problems that arose).
2ll
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
24
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
25 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 13.
26
521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
27 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 15-40;jOHN T. NooNAN,jR., THE LusTRE or OuR
COUNTRY: TI-IE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE or RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1998); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and lnteipretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV.
153 (1997).
28 See NARROWINt:, supra note I, at 40.
29
See id. at 41-85.
llO
See id. at 86-10 I; Fla. P1·epaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999). See generally B1)'ant & Simeone, sufJra note 8, at 348-52 (discussing
fl01ida Prejmid and comparing it with Boerne); Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The
CaseoJFederalRegulation oflntellectualProfJerty, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1331, 1331 (2001) (examining, in the face of sovereign immunity, "the options open to Congress ... [for] providing
... means to deter and redress violations by states of federal intellectual property rights").
lll
See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); NARROWING, sufmi
note 1, at 102-19. See generally Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 8, at 117-19, 160 (discussing
triumph of legislative record review in Congress's age- and disability-related legislation);
Ruth Colker &James]. Bn.1dney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 86, 141-43 (2001)
(discussing legislative and federalism implications of Garrell).
?.2 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 120-37 (discussing United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000), holding that Congress lacked the authority under either the Commerce
Clause or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which provided
federal civil remedies for victims of gender-motivated violence). See generally Kramer, supra
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Noonan admits the difficulty of calibrating perfect balances between
the states and the national government and among its co-equal
branches. However, his experience as a citizen immersed in law for
fifty years and as a reader of history prompts his conclusion that "[t]he
middle ground has ... moved, with unsettling consequences," and the
country's motto, e pluribus unum, must also be its polestar. 33
Chapter Seven proposes meaningful resolution, given the current
risk to democratic government, a risk that has upset vital balances in
organic national life, despite the judiciary's characterization as the
least dangerous branch. 34 Noonan canvasses a broad spectrum of
congressional responses. However, he deems a few, such as impeachment, too "heavy;" some, namely court funding, petty; and others, including Justices' confirmation, awkward. 35 Noonan finds legislation
most "readily available" 36 and surveys powers the Court has yet to restrict and ideas that could satisfy its constitutional standards, but he is
not sanguine about these measures' efficacy. 37 His obligatory allusion
to amending the Constitution recognizes the solution as difficult and
rare. 38
Noonan asserts that "[t]he sovereign remedy for ills in a democracy is exploration and exposition," assisting those with authority in
note 10, at 161-63 (criticizing Morrison as "constitutional history in a funhouse mirror");
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Seigel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation
After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE LJ. 441 (2000) (discussing Morrison's implications);
Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE LJ. 619
(2001) (criticizing "categorical federalism" as oversimplified).
33 NARROWING, sujJra note 1, at 14. See generally ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2001) (discussing federalism theory and jurisprudence).
34 See NARROWING, sujmL note 1, at 138-56; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton) ("[I]n a government in which [the departments of power] are separated from
each other, the judicial)', from the nature of iL~ functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution .... "). See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: T11E SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (discussing the Court's power and influence on the counll)').
35 See NARROWING, sujmL note l, at 140-41; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (referring to Congress's power" [ t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court"); art. 11,
§ 2, cl. 2 (referring to the president's power to appoint 'judges of the supreme Court");
art. 11, § 4 (stating that "[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors"). See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE
CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING Up THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS ( 1994) (criticizing
the politicization of the confirmation process); RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE
(1999) (discussing President Clinton's impeachment and surrounding events).
3fi
NARROWING, supra note ] ' at 141.
37
Id. at 141-43; see Colker & Brudney, supra note 31, at 136; Meltzer, supra note 30
and accompanying text.
38 NARROWING, suj1ra rfote 1, at 143; see U.S. CoNsT. art. V; see also A. Christopher
Bryant, Stopping Time: The Pro-slavery and "Irrevocable" 171irteenth Amendment, 26 HARv.J.L. &
Pus. Po1;v 501 (2003) (examining the historical and contemporaI)' significance ot~ exclusivity of, and limitations on the Article V amendment power of the Constitution).

1838

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:1833

exercising good sense to resolve problems. '1. v The author summarizes
his critique, emphasizing the Justices' abstractions and lack of concern for facts and for all the people affected by sovereign immunity. 40
He reiterates that the Court's approach to legislation is a novel, destructive creation that invades the prerogatives of Congress. 41 Noonan discredits congruence and proportionality for affording no real
measure, even as they prompt invention of the "legislative record" notion that similarly requires subjective judgment. 42 The writer chastises
the Justices for acting as if they alone have competence, positing that
only the people are supreme in the American form of government. 4 :i
Noonan analyzes the states' role in the Constitution, which does
not mention sovereign immunity, 44 while reviewing and exposing as
deficient arguments for sovereign immunity derived from structure,
solvency, tort, and dignity. 4 '' Immunity also resists felicitous application because it cannot be confined, equitably or consistently used, or
reconciled with the federal system. 46 Finding no support in the Constitution, the "nature of things," or statutes, the author concludes that
states can accord people unfair treatment only because the Court
"has, by its own will, moved the middle ground and narrowed the nation's power." 47

:ID
NARROWING, supra note 1, at 143; see Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, judicial
Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalisrn Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critiqw?, 111 YALE
LJ. 1707 (2002).
40
See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 143-45; see also infra notes 58-61 and accompany-

ing text.
41
See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 145-48; sufml notes 7-9, 26-32 and accompanying
text.
42 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 145-48; supra notes 7-9, 26-32 and accompanying
text.
4:1 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 149-50. See generally AcK~:RMAN, sufna note 16
(agreeing that only the American people are supreme and urging them to become informed and involved in their government).
44 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 150-53. See g1merally NAGEL, su/rm note 33 (discussing the social and legal history as well as implementation of federalism).
41> See NARROWING, su/Jra note 1, at 153-54; see also O.W. Holmes, Jr., 111e Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 ( 1897) ("l tis revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign lmrnunity, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1201, 1201 (2001) (arguing that sovereign
immunity is an unconstitutional anachronism).
46 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 154-56. See generally Caminker, su/na note 21 (arguing for a "rational relationship" test rather than the existing "congruence and proportionality" test); Meltzer, supra note 30, al 1343-89 (describing alternative courses of
legislative action in the face of sovereign immunity).
4 7 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 156.
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II.
CONTRIBUTIONS

Noonan provides many valuable insights. Most crucial, he illustrates the ways in which the new cases have shifted authority's previous
vertical balance toward the states from the federal government while
fostering horizontal accretion in the judiciary of power earlier held by
the legislative and executive branches. Prior scholarship had criticized individual decisions, and even changes in doctrine and emergent patterns, 48 but Narrowing is the clearest, fullest rendition thus far.
The book traces the applicable history, evaluates, and imposes a salutary conceptual structure on integral, specific opinions, identifies discrete doctrinal strands, and trenchantly shows that the whole is more
than the sum of its parts.
A related, helpful contribution is the clarity, force and candor
with which Noonan dissects the cases and finds them contradictory,
lacking constitutional support, and perhaps unprincipled. Noonan
sees as exaggerated and misguided the notion of state sovereignty that
pervades many rulings. 49 He vociferously criticizes the Justices for expanding the Eleventh Amendment language, thus limiting federal jurisdiction to resolve some litigation against state governments and
creating wider immunity that encompasses subsidiary bodies, such as
college presses. 50 Noonan attacks as "'ahistorical literalism' "51 the
Court's fidelity to the amendment's words, a fidelity which cannot sustain the inclusion of state court lawsuits within the immunity. 52 Noonan apparently believes the revisionist views of Justices who formerly
espoused adherence to constitutional text and the Framers' original
intent to be disingenuous, or even hypocritical. 53 The author damns
this method as "audacious" and "a pretense," while he expressly accuses the Court of securing a rhetorical benefit when it labels state
48 See, e.g., Symposium, Shifting the Balance of Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism, and
State Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1115 (2001); Symposium, State Sovereign Immunity
and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817 (2000); Bryant & Simeone, supra
note 8, at 354-89; Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 8, at 117-19, 160; Colker & Brudney,
sujJra note 31, at 86, 141-43; Kramer, supra note 10, at 161-63; Post & Seigel, supra note 32,
at 456-509; Resnik, supra note 32, at 626-56.
49 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 1-14, 138-56.
50
See, e.g., id. at 3, 86-101, 154-55.
51
Id. at 9 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999)).
52 See, e.g., id. at 9-10; supra notes 12, 44, 47 and accompanying text.
53 NARROWING, supra note I, at 9. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUGTION OF THE LAw (1990) (describing the politicization of
constitutional law as unfaithful to established doctrine); EARL M. MALTZ, RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAw viii (1994) (comparing various approaches to constitutional interpretation with "a constitutional state of nature ... under which the written constitution would
play no role in judicial decisionmaking"); A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAw (Amy Guttmann ed., 1997) (presenting arguments for and ag-<1inst textualism
in constitutional interpretation).
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sovereignty "'an eleventh amendment' matter." According to Noonan, the constitutional connection is imaginary. 54 Noonan disparages
the recent, sharp restriction of Congress's power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the Fourteenth Amendment. 55 He considers the decision that makes the Justices, not the lawmakers, the arbiters of
propriety to be an "invention," 56 premised on the amendment's misunderstanding, which enlarges judicial authority at the expense of the
legislature. 57
Particularly effective is his criticism of the novel demand that
Congress support legislative choices with an evidentiary record, rather
than material that the Court devalues as merely anecdotal.5 8 Noonan
recounts the travails of the litigants who actually pursue federalism
cases and chastises the Justices for ignoring them and millions of
other persons whom the opinions touch. 59 His admonitions are telling reminders that abstract conceptualizations of harmonious distribution of governmental power can profoundly affect individuals. The
recent decisions' gravest error is their authorization for states to treat
many people inequitably. 60 This insightful storytelling is thus redolent of Noonan's exploration of the individual in legal history, legal
philosophy, and legal education in Persons and Masks of the Law. 61
These ideas assume greater force because their advocate is a judicial officer, obligated to follow the precise rulings that he so incisively
criticizes. Noonan explains that judges and attorneys have an important duty to reform and enhance the law, and he astutely wonders
what change is more necessary than the elucidation of opinions that
do not implement purposes specified in the Constitution. 0 2

54
NARROWING, supra note 1, at 151-52. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 45 (arguing that sovereign immunity is not a constitutional doctrine and that it should be abolished
by the Supreme Court).
5 5 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 148-50; supra notes 8, 21 and accompanying text.
56 NARROWING, supra note 1, at 146.
57 See id. at 6-7, 145-47; supra notes 8-10, 21 and accompanying text.
58 See, e.g., NARROWING, supra note 1, at 5-6, 147-48. See generally Colker & Brudney,
supra note 31, at 108-10 (discussing the Court's rejection oflegislation in absence of sufficient legislative record in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)).
59
See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 12-13, 144-45; supra text accompanying note 8.
60 See NARROWING, supra note I, at 12, 144-45.
61
NoONAN, supra note 2. See generally Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2073 (1989) (exploring the importance of storytelling in law).
62 NARROWING, supra note 1, at 143. Noonan's candor perfectly shows the grave import of the Article 111 judiciary's independence. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS AND AMERICA'S COURTS 11-75, 129-71, 213-42 (2000); Symposium,
Judicial Independence and Accountability, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 311 (1999).
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III.
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Despite the numerous perceptive contributions afforded by Narrowing, I can proffer suggestions for future work .. Expanding on some
issues may facilitate comprehension of the present Court and its federalism jurisprudence. For instance, appreciating the ways in which
state sovereign immunity disadvantages individuals is certainly valuable, 63 although it would be equally useful to analyze the Court's influence on power's horizontal distribution given, for example, the Bush
Administration assertions of authority vis-a-vis Congress. 64 It would be
similarly advantageous to delineate the vertical effects, as national
power's devolution to the states seems anachronistic, if not dangerous, in a time of global crisis engendered by terrorism. 65 Detailing
the horizontal and vertical impacts might concomitantly inform modern domestic controversies, such as the preferable governmental
branch and level to address important societal concerns, including
crime, education, and the environment. 66 This knowledge would assist policymakers as well as the public in determining whether the
United States benefits fromjudicial power's accretion at the expense
of the legislative and executive branches or from increasing state authority vis-a-vis the federal govemment. 67
Notwithstanding Noonan's thorough critique and the urgent nature of his messages, they may reach a rather narrow audience. 68 The
theoretical complexity that inheres in federalism and sovereign immunity, the abstruse and coded nature of the rulings assessed, Noonan's
technical and occasionally elliptical approach to certain matters, and
the limited effectiveness of his dialogic technique might preclude
broad dissemination. Many readers without legal training could find
the book inaccessible, while even attorneys and law students may enSee supra notes 30-32, 58-60 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS
CONST. LQ. 373 (2002); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE LJ. 1725
(1996); Neal K. Katya! & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt Trying the Military
Tribunals, 111 YALE LJ. 1259 (2002).
65 See Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court Reassert National Authority?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
30, 2001, § 4, at 14. Cf HAROLD HoNGJU KoH, THE NATIONAL SEcURI1Y CoNSTITUTION
( 1990) (reconceptualizing constitutional power-sharing after Iran-Contra).
66
See Edward L Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L REv. 711 (2001); see also
Caminker, supra note 21 (criticizing the Court's power assertion and exploring alternative
sources of congressional power); Meltzer, supra note 30 (examining alternative courses of
action for Congress). See generally NAGEL, supra note 33 (exploring the implications of the
Court's federalism jurisprudence for various areas of American life and law).
67
See supra notes 64-65.
68
Linda Greenhouse, Beyond Original Intent, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002, § 7, at 8. For
one notable, albeit controversial, effort to reach a comparatively broad audience, see BoRK,
supra note 53.
63
64
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counter difficulty following the specific ideas that the writer accords
laconic treatment.
These concerns do not undermine Noonan's important contributions. However, he might have considered a few areas expressly or in
greater detail, extracted more lessons from the state sovereign immunity decisions, and proffered additional suggestions for rectifying or
ameliorating the current situation. lt would be valuable to have a
larger number of and more particularized insights from an observer
who has so assiduously studied federalism and separated powers.
Elaboration of his expert views on precisely why the doctrine developed as it did and on how to realize improvement would be instructive, especially for those who seek change in the recent case law. The
above concepts have particular salience when highly controversial,
strongly held perspectives on superior means of allocating governmental authority suffuse present discourse, and the United States confronts apparently insoluble domestic and world problems.
C0Nc1.us10N

Narrowing the Nation's Power substantially enhances appreciation of
the Court's federalism jurisprudence, demonstrating how the new
opinions have redistributed power between the states and the national
government and among the federal legislative, executive, and judicial
branches. Noonan illuminates a novel, critical jurisprudential turn
and its detrimental impacts, while he provides promising responses to
these phenomena.

